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ABSTRACT
The EUTF aims to address the ‘root causes of migration’ by providing
development assistance to countries of origin and transit. While it is allegedly
based on scientific evidence, scholarly consensus suggests that development
assistance is ill-suited to address irregular migration – which is something that
some of the actors who designed the EUTF were aware of. We advance a new
framework for understanding the emergence and success of pseudo-causal
narratives (i.e., narratives relying on unproven and/or disproven causal claims)
in EU policymaking. Using frame analysis, we argue that the pseudo-causal
‘root causes’ narrative was adopted against better evidence because it was
plausible, compelling and had been used in EU external migration policies
before. Faced with the salience of migration and the urgency to act in late
2015, and due to the absence of any clear ideas of what other measures could
work, EU actors adopted this narrative to demonstrate that they were actively
responding to the ‘crisis’. The narrative met little contestation, since it met the
concerns of both those who were keen to stop migration and those who
wanted to preserve the core of previous EU development policy.
KEYWORDS EU external migration policy; framing; policy narratives; evidence-based policymaking;
development aid; European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
Introduction
At the European Union (EU)-Africa summit in Vienna in December 2018, Euro-
pean Parliament President Antonio Tajani proclaimed: ‘We need a Marshall
Plan for Africa worth €50bn […]. By creating opportunities for young Africans
at home we can stop migration flows to Italy and Europe’ (Banks, 2018).
Framing aid as a tool to address migratory movements is not completely
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new, not even in the EU. Ever since the December 1992 Edinburg European
Council, government and EU officials have made periodic calls to address the
root causes of migration through a comprehensive approach in origin and
transit countries. Yet these calls had not been translated into policies. The
initiatives adopted instead had focused on exporting migration control
measures and had dealt only cursorily with root causes and preventive
measures in countries of origin (Castles, 2004, p. 219). In short, until recently,
EU policies aiming to address the root causes of migration had suffered from
a gap between rhetoric and action. The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 argu-
ably bridged this gap, leading to the creation of a policy instrument that prior-
itizedaddressing ‘root causes’. Adopted at theNovember 2015Valetta Summit,
the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (‘EUTF’) indeed seeks to
address ‘the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular
migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportu-
nities, security and development’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). As of 10
December 2020, the EUTF has approved 254 projects worth €4.85 billion (Euro-
peanCommission, 2020b) implemented in26Africancountries that are ‘among
the most fragile and affected by instability, forced displacement and irregular
migration’ (European Commission, 2019, p. 1).
While the narrative of preventing migration by addressing its root causes
seems compelling, it contradicts the broad academic consensus that develop-
ment fuels migration rather than stops it (Angenendt et al., 2017; Fratzke &
Salant, 2018; Nyberg Sørense et al., 2003). Indeed, the poorest of the poor
cannot migrate, as migration involves costs. This paper seeks to elucidate
the processes leading to the adoption of the ‘root causes’ narrative of the
EUTF. More specifically, we are interested in why EU policymakers, and particu-
larly the European Commission, put a disproven causal claim, the ‘root causes’
narrative, at the centre of its policy, even when some of the actors involved were
aware that the narrative was flawed. The European Commission’s role is par-
ticularly interesting in this regard, as it is usually considered a technocratic
and expertise-led actor in EU policymaking – although there is an increasing
awareness of its politicized nature (e.g., Christiansen, 1997).
Studying the so-far under-researched EUTF, our paper contributes to
research on evidence-based policymaking and policy narratives. The litera-
ture on evidence-based policymaking largely concurs on the idea of a stra-
tegic and selective use or non-use of genuine research and evidence in EU
policymaking. Our paper confirms these findings, but it also adds a new
dimension to the debate by demonstrating how EU actors – instead of just
using evidence selectively – knowingly adopt and accept causal narratives
that go against extant evidence, while allegedly following an evidence-
based approach. Research on policy narratives (Boswell et al., 2011; Roe,
1994) has shown how narratives may be based on unproven causal claims,
but has not considered the use of disproven causal claims (Boswell et al.,
2 N. ZAUN AND O. NANTERMOZ
2011, p. 1). Further developing the framework by Boswell et al. (2011) by
differentiating the conditions for the adoption of a policy narrative, we, more-
over, aim to provide a better understanding of how unproven and even dis-
proven causal narratives emerge in EU policymaking. The case of the EUTF is
particularly puzzling in this regard, as the EUTF specifically claims to ground
its interventions on ‘an evidence-based approach in order to understand
drivers, dynamics of migration, and to map out responses’ (European Com-
mission, n.d.). The disconnect between the EUTF’s self-proclaimed ‘evi-
dence-based’ approach and its reliance on a pseudo-causal narrative
contradicting widely accepted scholarly findings provide an opportunity to
theorize about the conditions under which unproven and disproven
pseudo-causal narratives emerge. In so doing, we do not seek to test the
theory in a rigorous way, but rather to provide an exploratory study of
these conditions through the case of the EUTF.
Using the method of frame analysis (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 1996) and
drawing on theories of framing and policy narratives, we assess how the
assumptions linking development aid to reduced migration flows were con-
structed and propose several conditions for the successful emergence of a
pseudo-causal narrative, whether based on an unproven or a disproven
claim. We argue that the ‘root causes’ frame was adopted because it was
plausible, compelling and well established in EU policymaking circles. More-
over, several political and contextual factors contributed to its success, such
as the prominence of the perceived ‘refugee crisis’ and the urgent need to
respond to it, the uncertainty around what policies could effectively stop
migration, and the support given to the narrative both from actors who
wanted to stop migration and those who wanted to preserve the core of
development aid. The ‘root causes’ frame allowed the European Commission
to rally support and reassert its legitimacy, especially at a time when it was
receiving increased criticism over its inability to resolve the internal struggles
in the EU regarding solidarity in refugee protection. To conduct this frame
analysis, we draw on official EU documents, press releases and project
reports related to the EUTF, as well as on 23 original interviews conducted
in May 2019 and February 2020 with policymakers in EU institutions, national
officials in Member States’ Permanent Representations, and civil society
organizations (see methodological appendix).
The paper is structured as follows: following a brief review of the literature
on the (non-)use of evidence in policymaking, we present our theoretical fra-
mework on the construction of pseudo-causal narratives, drawing on the lit-
erature on framing and policy narratives. Based on Rein’s and Schön’s version
of frame analysis, we analyse the evolution of the root causes frame in the
EUTF by first presenting the diagnosis of the problem to be addressed accord-
ing to EU actors, then discussing the remedy or prognosis proposed by the
EU, and finally engaging with the political dynamics behind the adoption
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of the frame. We conclude by reflecting on the role of pseudo-causal narra-
tives in EU migration policymaking (and beyond).
The (non)use of research evidence in EU policymaking and the
adoption of pseudo-causal narratives
Most scholarship on evidence-based policymaking deplores the insufficient
or inadequate use of scientific research in the policymaking process. Some
scholars argue this is because the policymaking community and the scien-
tific community are ‘two (distinct) communities’ that need to respond to
very different demands (Cairney, 2016; Caplan, 1979; Parkhurst, 2017;
Stoker & Evans, 2016): Whilst for researchers publishing comes first and
foremost, policymakers need to meet tight deadlines and respond to the
political demands of different audiences. This scholarship, therefore,
focuses on suggesting ways to either make the policy process more hospi-
table to the use of evidence or to make research more relevant to policy-
making (Bartlett, 2013; Torriti, 2010). Another strand of the literature
argues that policymakers use evidence strategically, i.e., in support of
policy choices that they would take regardless. Hence, evidence is often
driven by political concerns rather than the other way around, with politi-
cal constraints leaving little space for evidence-based policies (Bartlett,
2013; Schlaufer, 2018, pp. 93–94). Research on the use of evidence in EU
policymaking largely echoes this latter perspective (Bartlett, 2013;
Sharman & Holmes, 2010; Torriti, 2010).
In sum, research on evidence-based policymaking has focused on asses-
sing the reasons for the use or non-use of genuine scientific evidence.
However, comparatively little attention has been paid to the creation
and mobilization of pseudo-causal narratives by policymakers, that is, nar-
ratives that appear and/or claim to be scientific and factual but whose
central claim is either unproven or has been disproven by the available
scientific evidence. This neglect is in part due to a focus on ‘the instrumen-
tal use of knowledge’, i.e., we do not talk about specific evidence but evi-
dence more generally evidence used as a tool for the betterment of policy,
which does not consider the ‘symbolic functions’ of knowledge, namely its
capacity to lend legitimacy and credibility to certain actors and their policy
positions, and to justify their actions (Boswell, 2008, 2009). One notable
exception is Boswell (2008), who draws on Brunsson (1989) to distinguish
two types of organizations: action organizations and political organiz-
ations. Action organizations derive their legitimacy from the impact of
their social interventions and use research evidence instrumentally to
improve their performance. In contrast, political organizations derive
their legitimacy from talk (referring to certain norms and values) and
from appearing ‘actionary’ in responding to pressing issues. Boswell
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(2008, pp. 473–476) expects that political organizations will use expert
knowledge strategically to garner support: by demonstrating a commit-
ment to basing their decisions on evidence, political organizations not
only strengthen and legitimize their own role but also substantiate their
claims in contested policy areas such as migration.
Building on Boswell’s framework, we posit that ‘pseudo-causal’ narratives,
based on unproven and/or disproven causal claims, will under certain circum-
stances play the same legitimating and substantiating functions as genuine
scientific evidence. We illustrate this theoretical expectation empirically
through the example of the ‘root causes’ frame in the EUTF. Some research
already points to the fact that migration policy, seemingly backed up by evi-
dence, may in fact be grounded in unproven causal claims: Baldwin-Edwards
et al. (2019, p. 2148), for instance, have argued that EU migration policies
post-2015 have been assumption-led rather than evidence-based, with pol-
icymakers showing themselves unwilling to recognize the complex and
mixed nature of migration flows. Hence, even policies that claim to be
based on evidence are often based on a clever argumentative connection
of cause and effect for which there is no strong empirical evidence. Whilst
Baldwin-Edwards et al. present a case of what we would call unproven
causal claims, the EUTF relies on a disproven causal claim, i.e., a connection
of cause and effect that is widely considered incorrect among scholars. To
understand how such ‘pseudo-causal narratives’ can convince audiences
and triumph despite their empirical inaccuracy, we turn to the literature on
policy narratives.
According to Roe (1994, p. 51), narratives stabilize ‘the assumptions
needed for decision-making in the face of what is genuinely uncertain and
complex [emphasis added]. They can be representationally inaccurate – and
recognisably so – but still persist, indeed thrive’. The relationship between
migration and development certainly qualifies as uncertain and complex,
since it is not clear which interventions or policies can effectively contribute
to reducing migration flows. Given this uncertainty, policymakers may be
prone to rhetorically establish a causal link, regardless of whether it holds
or not. We would add that they do so specifically in highly salient policy
areas and in times of an increased perception of the urgency to act – such
as the 2015 EU ‘refugee crisis’, which put policymakers in the position of
having to quickly adopt a narrative concerning how their policies were
going to address the crisis. Again, bearing in mind the symbolic functions
of knowledge, the need for an effective policy in terms of potential outputs
and outcomes was arguably less important than demonstrating to the Euro-
pean public that action was being taken. Besides, Boswell et al. (2011, p. 1)
argue that such narrative constructions are more likely to be successful if
they are cognitively plausible, dramatically or morally compelling, and if they
chime with perceived interests. We would add that such narratives are also
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more likely to be adopted if they have been used before and gone unchal-
lenged. Especially in situations of high levels of uncertainty and urgency,
being able to draw on existing blueprints saves time and energy for policy-
makers, who cannot risk proposing a narrative that will meet with broad scep-
ticism and contestation.
These narrative constructions, in turn, act as framing devices ‘that guide both
analysis and action in practical situations’ (Rein & Schön, 1996, p. 89).1 Drawing
on theories of framing and frame analysis, we analyse how the pseudo-causal
‘root causes’ frame was adopted and presented as scientifically warranted.
Policy frames are strong and generic narratives that include two important
elements: they identify the issue at stake (diagnosis: what needs fixing) and
they prescribe solutions (prognosis: what should be done about the issue).
Policy frames, however, ‘do not float freely’: the institutional configuration, the
distribution of power and the preferences of the actors involved are all crucial
to understanding the emergence and effects of a frame (Lavenex, 2001,
pp. 21–22; Risse-Kappen, 1994). To account for the emergence of the frame of
‘addressing the root causes of migration through development aid’, we
examine how the problem was defined, what policy solutions were advanced
in response, and the constellationofpreferencesof thedifferent actors involved.
These three dimensions are, of course, interdependent: defining a problem
already constrains the typeof policy solutions available,meaning that prognosis
and diagnosis are often two sides of the same coin. Besides, the distribution of
power and the preferences of actors influence both the framing of the issue at
stake and the solutions put forward. Still, disentangling these three dimensions
conceptually does allow for greater clarity (even though we will see in our
empirical analysis that they overlap).
We summarize the conditions for the adoption of pseudo-causal narratives
by political actors in Table 1, separating between the diagnostic and prognos-
tic dimension on the one hand, and the political dimension on the other. Con-
ditions for the successful adoption of a narrative that lie in the narrative itself
are summarized under diagnosis/prognosis; exogenous conditions relating to
decision-making are subsumed under politics.
In what follows, we demonstrate how these conditions affected the emer-
gence of the ‘root causes’ narrative in the diagnosis, prognosis and decision-
making processes leading to the adoption of the EUTF.
Table 1. Conditions for the adoption of pseudo-causal narratives underwriting policy.
Diagnosis/prognosis Politics
Narrative cognitively plausible High level of salience and urgency to take action
Narrative compelling (morally/dramatically) Complexity and uncertainty about true causal links
Narrative has been made before (path-
dependence/existing blueprints)
Causal narrative fits the (potentially conflicting)
interests of decision-makers
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Diagnosis: the ‘European refugee crisis’ as a result of factors in
sending and transit countries
As Sandberg (2006, p. 211) notes, any framing process first involves identify-
ing the specific problem at stake and answering the question of ‘who is to
blame?’. This implies that problems do not exist per se but are usually
defined as such by policymakers. The actors who get to define a problem,
who frame it, are in a powerful position, since the frame already precludes
certain solutions from being considered. The perceived problem to be
addressed has shifted at different times in the ‘European refugee crisis’.
Initially, the EU’s definition of the problem revolved around managing and
distributing those asylum-seekers who had already arrived in Europe, particu-
larly in Italy and Greece (and to a certain extent in Hungary). The Council
adopted two relocation schemes in September 2015 to support these
countries and to prevent the self-relocation of asylum-seekers facing inhu-
mane conditions (2015a, 2015b). However, the negotiations over these
schemes were highly controversial, partly due to a distributive conflict
between Member States: while states receiving higher asylum-seeker
shares (either as border or as destination countries in North-Western
Europe) wanted to see redistribution, Central Eastern European countries pre-
ferred maintaining the status quo so as not to incur additional responsibilities
(Biermann et al., 2019). A subsequent initiative on long-term solidarity invol-
ving a permanent stand-alone quota system turned out to be highly contro-
versial and was soon deadlocked (Zaun, 2018).
With no durable solution in the internal dimension in sight, EU institutions
and Member States focused on the external dimension of migration policies,
where Member States’ positions were more congruent. The problems to be
addressed were now (a) the arrival of immigrants in Europe and (b) the
reasons making them leave their home countries. The arrival of immigrants
in Europe was addressed by the reinforcement of Frontex with the European
Border and Coast Guard Regulation to stop ‘irregular migration’ and ‘human
smuggling’ in the Mediterranean, and by the adoption of an EU-Turkey State-
ment aiming to disincentivize migrants from entering Greece irregularly from
Turkey (Slominski & Trauner, 2018). Yet EU policymakers were aware that
these measures, while providing a temporary band-aid to arrivals at the
EU’s external borders, would do little to stop immigration in the longer
term. A shift in focus towards ‘upstream work’ (i.e., work closer to sending
countries) was therefore needed (Interview_PermRep_6). Hence the resol-
ution to directly address the root causes of the ‘problem’, i.e., the reasons
why migrants leave their home countries. Another ‘problem’ that a stronger
focus on ‘root causes’ (rather than border or return policies) could address
was the significant loss of human lives occurring in the Mediterranean,
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represented in the media by the death of refugee child Alan Kurdi (Adler-
Nissen et al., 2020).
According to the Commission Decision of November 2015 creating the
EUTF, the root causes that needed to be addressed included ‘demographic
pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, insti-
tutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insuffi-
cient resilience to food crises’, as well as internal armed conflicts, terrorist
threats and a deteriorated security environment (European Commission,
2015, p. 1). This was not the first time ‘root causes’ such as underdevelopment
in sending and transit countries had been framed as a problem to be
addressed by EU policies. After the 1992 European Council, the frame was
taken up again in 2005, when the Spanish Canary Islands experienced an
increase in arrivals of migrants by boat. Whilst the narrative was also
centred on underdevelopment as a driver of African emigration, policies con-
tinued to focus onmigration control rather than development, either through
the ‘stick’ of readmission agreements or the ‘carrots’ of visa facilitation and
mobility partnerships (Vives, 2017). Nonetheless, the long-standing (rhetori-
cal) commitment to the ‘root causes’ frame signalled to policymakers that–
at least politically – the frame was not contested. This facilitated its re-emer-
gence after the perceived ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, when the Commission had
to propose solutions under severe time pressure and high levels of politiciza-
tion – this time not only in Spain but across Member States – to show that the
EU was actively addressing the ‘crisis’ (Interview_PermRep_6). As the problem
was much more encompassing in scope and scale, a significant stepping up
of resources (Interview_COM_1) was required, resulting in the creation of the
EUTF.
Prognosis: ‘addressing the root causes of migration’ through
development aid
The prognosis element of a frame refers to the policy ideas that are presented
as a solution to a previously defined problem. In this section, we first demon-
strate how the EUTF was initially conceived in the context of the EU-Sahel
Strategy, providing a ready-made blueprint which was repurposed in 2015
in response to the refugee crisis. Next, we demonstrate that the EUTF
claims to be evidence-based. Finally, we show how the intuitiveness of the
‘root causes frame’ contributed to its adoption and, finally, discuss its
morally and dramatically compelling character.
In their ‘garbage can model’ of policymaking, Cohen et al. (1972) have
argued that policy ideas are not always developed in response to a need
for policy change but are often pre-existing and reused in situations where
new policies must be adopted quickly. Conventional wisdom suggests that
the EUTF was developed as a response to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. But in
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fact, the EUTF was conceived much earlier, following the adoption of the 2011
EU-Sahel Strategy, which aimed to address key issues of security and devel-
opment in a region increasingly torn by destabilization and jihadist terrorism.
DG DEVCO developed the idea of a Trust Fund to allow the Strategy to be
implemented more rapidly (Interview_COM_3; Interview_COM_4; Interview_-
COM_5). The idea was eventually enthusiastically supported by Member
States and the College of Commissioners during the 2015 crisis and was
sold as a migration management instrument. Given the time constraints
the Commission was facing, having a ready-made ‘solution’ to the ‘refugee
crisis’ in the drawer clearly simplified its adoption. The full title ‘EUTF for Stab-
ility and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced
Persons in Africa’ still testifies to how two different goals – creating stability
and addressing the root causes of migration – were juxtaposed in a single
instrument. According to a high-ranking Commission official, the notion of
‘emergency’ in the EUTF initially referred to the emergency situation in the
Sahel region, such as Mali or parts of Nigeria where Boko Haram is active
(Interview_COM_3). However, many observers in Member States or EU insti-
tutions who were not involved in the design of the initial instrument interpret
the emergency as being the increased inflow of migrants into Europe in 2015
(Interview_EP_3; Interview_PermRep_1; Interview_PermRep_2; Interview_-
PermRep_6), even though most migrants did not come from Africa, but the
Middle East. The further the EUTF developed, the more exclusively it empha-
sized projects aimed at decreasing migration rather than creating stability
(Interview_CSO_1; Interview_EP_2). In short, drawing on the narrative of
using aid to ‘address the root causes’ of migration allowed the Commission
to connect the EUTF’s original solution of creating stability in the Sahel
region with the diagnosis of a ‘European refugee crisis’. Thus, projects
adopted in the former area could be sold as contributing to migration man-
agement aims.
The importance of evidence in the design of the EUTF is manifest in the
Constitutive Agreement adopted in Valetta on 12 November 2015, which
suggests that the EUTF would ‘be guided by a strategy – underpinned by a
clear evidence base – which will determine its objectives and priority
sectors’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 10). In the Strategic Board meetings,
both the Commission and Member States have reiterated the importance for
the EUTF of investing in research and of applying an evidence-based
approach (European Commission, 2016b). If the EUTF has indeed invested
in research, evidence and monitoring facilities, these facilities are mainly
mobilized at the implementation and evaluation stages, e.g., to assess
whether EUTF projects meet their specific development goals rather than
whether they have an effect on migratory flows (Interview_COM_3;
Interview_PermRep_6).
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We now turn to assess why using aid to ‘address root causes’ then became
such a powerful frame despite its disregard for established research findings
suggesting that aid will not stop migration. The EUTF does not merely juxta-
pose development aid and migration rhetorically (as previous programmes
did), but strongly focuses on development projects in practice: between
2016 and 2019 (own calculations, see appendix), traditional aid programmes
promoting greater economic and employment opportunities constitute the
second biggest chunk of the funds provided (24 per cent of EUTF funding).
The adoption of these programmes is justified by the (once again unsubstan-
tiated) assertion ‘that short and long-term grievances arising from economic
and social exclusion, marginalisation and inequality are amongst the most
significant drivers of violence, forced displacement and illegal migration’
(European Commission, 2020a). The biggest chunk of EUTF funding,
however, still goes to migration governance and border protection (32 per
cent of EUTF funding), demonstrating that the EU has not fully abandoned
the migration control focus. Funding for other traditional development
aims of food security, better health services and education comprises 21
per cent of the EUTF budget. Conflict prevention receives 9 per cent of the
funding, while infrastructure, institutions and governance receive 12 per
cent. The strong focus on traditional development aid programmes and
especially ‘economic opportunities’ seems particularly puzzling when consid-
ering the evidence on the impact of development on migration: research
suggests that development aid has a limited capacity and effectiveness to
contribute to employment or economic growth (Schöfberger & Venturi,
2018, p. 3). Even more paradoxically (and problematically), there is a broad
scholarly consensus that economic development leads to more rather than
less migration, at least in the short term. This is often referred to as the
‘migration hump’ (Angenendt et al., 2017; Fratzke & Salant, 2018; Nyberg
Sørense et al., 2003). Economic development, and especially income-generat-
ing projects, including temporary job creation, is expected to raise the aspira-
tions of potential migrants and facilitate their access to the resources needed
to move – thereby stimulating migration (Ascencio, 1990). Only when a
country reaches an upper-middle income level is the relationship reversed
– a threshold that is out of reach in the short and medium term for the
countries targeted by the EUTF. More recently, some scholars have argued
that improvements in governance and the quality of and access to public ser-
vices may help reduce emigration, although the effect is small (MEDAM,
2018). Still, only a small fraction (12 per cent) of EUTF funding is dedicated
to investment in governance, public services and institutions.
Despite its weakness, the ‘root causes’ frame is repeated almost identi-
cally in every EUTF-funded action or project and linked to the overall
project-specific objectives through quasi-causal arguments. These argu-
ments are ‘quasi-causal’ because they may or may not hold empirical
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validity (Weldes, 1996, p. 282). It is not their accuracy that matters, but that
they provide ‘warranting conditions’ which ‘make a particular action or
belief more “reasonable”, “justified”, or “appropriate”, given the desires,
beliefs, and expectations of the actors’ (Fay, 1975, p. 85). The absence of
empirical evidence or scientific backing for such claims may reinforce
their capacity of persuasion by portraying these quasi-causal relationships
as self-evident. Consider the following statement by Commissioner for Inter-
national Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica when announcing
two new projects for Senegal under the EUTF (European Commission,
2016a):
The EU will continue to support the Government of Senegal in its endeavour to
improve access to basic social services, to make its economy more competitive
and to strengthen food security and agricultural development. I am convinced
that improved living conditions in rural areas and new job opportunities will go
a long way to address root causes of irregular migration and make a real differ-
ence in the prospects of Senegalese people.
Here, the audience is urged to share the confidence of Commissioner
Mimica that increased economic opportunities will contribute to tackling
the underlying drivers of migration (and thus help curb migration flows to
Europe). The argument seemingly needs no further explanation or justifica-
tion, appealing to the audience’s ‘common sense’. Likewise, it is not demon-
strated how and why funding under the EUTF as a form of international aid is
able to remedy these root causes. And yet, almost anything – or quite literally
‘everything’ (Interview_ EEAS_1) – becomes included within the remit of EU
development cooperation: with the EUTF, the EU indeed hopes ‘to address
a wide range of ills’with projects focusing on employment creation, basic ser-
vices such as health and education, food security and environmental protec-
tion, and measures to fight human smuggling and trafficking (Alfonso &
Immenkamp, 2015, pp. 8–9). These examples confirm that scientific evidence
plays a symbolic rather than an instrumental role in the design of the EUTF
and its ‘root causes’ frame: claims of reliance on an ‘evidence-based
approach’ legitimize and naturalize the EUTF, even when the narrative is
not supported by scientific research or is, as we have shown, even disproven
by research. The frame’s constant repetition in every EUTF policy document,
project plan or press release reifies and naturalizes it, which contributes to the
frame going widely unchallenged.
Aside from being intuitive and appealing to common sense, the ‘root
causes’ narrative is also morally and dramatically compelling. In early Septem-
ber 2015, the widely mediatized images of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian
boy who had drowned on his way to Europe, spurred renewed calls for a
more humane immigration policy and for ending the EU’s ‘political inaction’
(Adler-Nissen et al., 2020). Meanwhile, most Member States remained
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strongly opposed to hosting large numbers of refugees. Preventing migration
by addressing its ‘root causes’ was a convenient solution to address the issue
of rising deaths at Europe’s borders whilst keeping borders closed. Other pol-
icies aiming at stopping emigration in sending and transit countries, such as
cooperation with the Libyan coast guard and policies focusing on the preven-
tion of human smuggling and trafficking, had received widespread criticism,
especially by NGOs (Statewatch, 2020). The ‘root causes’ frame has received
much less negative attention because, in contrast to the ‘fight against smug-
gling’, the provision of development aid is less contested, especially in circles
of migrant advocacy groups. This is because the ‘root causes’ frame’ focuses
on ending the drivers of forced migration, while implying less of a use of force
compared to return and readmission policies. Through frame amplification,
the frame’s legitimacy was thus further enhanced (Benford & Snow, 2000,
p. 624). Frame amplification refers to a situation where a recognized policy
aim – such as the desirability of development – is used to legitimize and
embellish a more controversial or stigmatized policy, in this case migration
control. This makes the frame of ‘addressing the root causes of migration’
appealing to actors who would otherwise be sceptical of it, e.g., African
partner countries, European development ministries and agencies, and NGOs.
Politics: the struggle between reshaping development aid and
protecting its core
Framing is an exercise of power: the frame adopted and the solutionsprescribed
by it reflect what is politically feasible, given the preferences of the actors
involved. Understanding the political dynamics behind the EUTF’s design and
adoption is, therefore, crucial to explaining why evidence suggesting that this
policy is flawedwas disregarded. We argue that the ‘root causes’ framewas suc-
cessful not only because it was intuitive, compelling and had been used before,
but also because of the urgency to take action in late 2015, the complexity and
uncertainty that existed concerning true causal claims, and the fact that the nar-
rative fitted in with the interests of decision-makers.
Migration was a highly salient issue in late 2015 when the EUTF was
adopted, with the European Commission under severe ‘political and
popular pressure to do something’ to address the ‘crisis’ (Interview_Perm-
Rep_6). This pressure was arguably all the more prevalent as the Commis-
sion’s role in proposing internal measures on the temporary and
permanent relocation of refugees in Europe had not yielded the expected
results, but had instead aggravated internal divisions between Member
States (Interview_PermRep_1; Interview_PermRep_6; Interview_EP_1). This
favoured a concerted approach within the Commission and its different
DGs. Starting in late 2015, all actors working on migration (especially in the
Commission but also in the European External Action Service) met regularly
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to streamline their activities (Interview_COM_1; Interview_COM_2; Intervie-
w_EEAS_1; Interview_EEAS_2). Likewise, especially Member States that
were affected by the ‘crisis’ faced increased pressures to act. The ‘root
causes’ frame hence allowed both the political level of the EU and national
governments to show that they were effectively responding to the ‘refugee
crisis’ and preventing something similar from happening again (Interview_-
COM_1; Interview_EP_2; Interview_EP_3).
Our interviews suggest that those who were most aware of the ‘migration
hump’ literature were to be found mainly among EU and national bureau-
crats, particularly in DG DEVCO and in domestic Development Ministries
and Divisions, while the political level of the Commission and within
Member States and sometimes actors with a background in Justice and
Home Affairs were often unaware, buying more easily into the ‘root causes’
narrative (Interview_COM_1; Interview_PermRep_4; Interview_PermRep_5;
Interview_Perm_Rep_7). Those in DG DEVCO who were aware of it raised
this several times in the context of the EUTF’s adoption; however, they
were not listened to: ‘We tried to advise our people regularly that evidence
shows that there is a “migration hump”, but it didn’t take root, it was not
what they wanted to hear’ (Interview_COM_1). Hence, the adoption of the
narrative was partly based on the fact that not all actors at the EU level
and within Member States were aware of the faultiness of the ‘root causes
narrative’, and partly due to some actors in the Commission deliberately
ignoring the evidence. Even when the European Political Strategy Centre
(the Commission’s in-house think tank) drew attention to the existence of
the ‘migration hump’ by stressing that ‘economic development spurs
migration in the short-term’ (EPSC, 2017, p. 8), those conclusions were met
with heavy scepticism. Some Member States even questioned whether this
was ‘really true’ (Interview_COM_1) and the findings of the report were even-
tually disregarded and discussed no further (Interview_COM_1; Interview_-
COM_2). This explains why the ‘root causes’ frame remained largely
uncriticized.
What further contributed to the adoption of the frame was the complexity
and uncertainty over genuine causal links between alternative migration pol-
icies and the reduction of irregular migration flows. Whilst some policymakers
were made aware that development would not prevent migration, they
lacked evidence of what could stop it. There is indeed much more of a con-
sensus on what does not work to prevent migration, such as restrictive
border policies (Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007) or restrictive visa practices
(Czaika & Hobolth, 2016), than on what does work. This arguably contributed
to the adoption of a narrative that was factually incorrect.
A final reason behind the successful adoption of the ‘root causes’ frame is
that it bridged the divergent concerns of those actors who wanted to adopt
specific migration control policies with those who aimed to preserve the
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development core of the EUTF. Member States that had populist parties in
power (such as Italy, Austria and the Visegrad countries), as well as countries,
such as France and Germany, where moderate governments were under
pressure from populists gaining electoral ground, had a strong interest to
stop further migration to Europe through migration control policies (Zaun,
2018; Interview_EP_1; Interview_PermRep_1; Interview_PermRep_5). These
same countries are also among the EUTF’s biggest bilateral donors (European
Commission, 2020b). Yet countries with a strong development aid tradition
sought to protect the traditional core of development assistance – not
least because two-thirds of the funding came from the European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF) (European Commission, 2020b). To manage these divergent
preferences, the European Commission incorporated elements of the conflict-
ing demands of the two camps (Brunsson, 1989). The compromise consisted
in partly repurposing the funding to spend it on migration control purposes
while otherwise rebranding previous and ongoing development policies as
economic and job creating policies that address ‘the root causes’ of
migration.
Member States favouring the migration control approach supported the
‘root causes’ frame as it allowed them to show to their domestic audiences
that they were acting to prevent irregular migration flows. Yet even among
actors with a long-standing tradition in development aid (such as Luxem-
bourg, Ireland, Sweden, Finland or the German Development Ministry),
some were aware of the flaws in the ‘root causes’ frame but nevertheless pro-
moted it, albeit for a very different reason: they wanted to ensure that an
important proportion of EUTF money continued to be spent on traditional
development policies. As one interviewee highlights:
We and others have called on the EUTF being used for poverty reduction. It’s
not like Member States are not aware [of the migration hump], but it’s a
tricky situation for several countries, because [funding under the EUTF] came
from the EDF… For us, it’s still development cooperation money […]. So there-
fore, we take the narrative, and we take the purpose that we see in the EDF, and
we apply it to the EUTF, where we say, of course, root causes should be the bulk
of what we do in the EUTF, and we think that’s good Development Cooperation,
that’s a way to spend money wisely… If that’s inside the EUTF or the EDF, that’s
secondary…We continue to push for the root causes… because this is still
development cooperation money, […] we never wanted it to be 100% going
to migration control. (Interview_PermRep_7)
This shows that for the European Commission, presenting aid as a solution to
migratory movements was a way to respond to both the demand for more
migration control and for a continuation of traditional development policies.
The very inaccuracy of the ‘root causes’ narrative, in fact, served to reconcile
the need for talking about migration control while largely acting to preserve
the core of development policy (Brunsson, 1989).
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Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed how the EU successfully introduced its frame
of ‘addressing the root causes of migration’ through development aid into
the EUTF. The adoption of this frame despite its inherently flawed logic is par-
ticularly paradoxical, not least when considering the EUTF’s self-declared aim
to provide evidence-based policymaking. Through a frame analysis of the
‘root causes’ narrative, we have argued that the narrative was successfully
enshrined in the EUTF because of several factors lying in the narrative
itself, namely that it was cognitively plausible, morally compelling, and had
been previously established and used without much contestation among
the actors involved. Moreover, several contextual and political factors contrib-
uted to its adoption: the decision-making on the EUTF occurred at a time of
high salience and urgency, which pushed the Commission to propose a policy
swiftly. This proved particularly challenging, as no positive causal narrative of
what policies could stop migration was available. At the same time, the nar-
rative bridged the concerns of different audiences, including those actors
who favoured more migration control and those who wanted to maintain
the core of development policy. While previous research has focused on
the (non-)use of genuine evidence in policymaking, this analysis has shown
that pseudo-causal narratives (based on unproven or even disproven
causal claims) can fulfil the same legitimising functions, especially when an
actor (such as the European Commission) faces strong political pressure to
propose a response to a perceived crisis but has few formal powers to do so.
The use of pseudo-causal narratives seems to be a wider dynamic in EU
migration policy. Other examples include the narrative suggesting that har-
monising asylum policies across the EU prevents secondary movements
from border countries, or the narrative that restrictive border policies deter
irregular migration (and reversely, that operations of rescue at sea represent
a pull factor). With regard to the former, research has suggested that second-
ary movements are not mainly driven by policies but by factors such as colo-
nial ties, the presence of migrant networks, or a country’s reputation,
including as regards its economic or human rights situation (Neumayer,
2005; Thielemann, 2006). Still, up to now policy harmonization is framed as
the sole solution to address secondary movements. Likewise, the assertion
that strengthening border control and ending rescue operations at sea will
stop irregular migration is not supported by evidence (Cornelius & Salehyan,
2007; Cusumano & Villa, 2019). Instead, these measures have been found to
divert migrants towards more dangerous routes, encouraging recourse to
smuggling networks, and more generally, increasing the risk of deaths at
sea. Whilst these narratives are not presented as evidence-based, and while
the evidence opposing the EU’s causal narratives is certainly not as strongly
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established as in the case of the ‘root causes’ narrative, it is still striking that
such unwarranted narratives are so widely used in EU migration policies.
The problem of using unwarranted causal narratives has become a salient
issue in politics in recent years. Our analysis has shown that such narratives
may also be advanced by actors that one might least expect to use them,
namely technocratic actors such as the European Commission, which are
usually considered to base their work on expertise and knowledge
(Rimkutė & Haverland, 2015). Yet, it seems that, given their limited capacity
to act, these types of actors tend to promote policies that legitimize their
role politically, especially when they are under pressure. Further research
could analyse to what extent similar dynamics are present in other salient
policy areas of EU policymaking in which the causal links are highly uncertain
and where the conditions for the adoption of unproven or disproven causal
claims identified in this paper are present.
Note
1. We use ‘narrative’ and ‘frame’ interchangeably, conceiving of policy narratives
as a specific kind of framing device.
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